--- /dev/null
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ handle SMBsessionsetup
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1998-2001
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001
+ Copyright (C) Jim McDonough <jmcd@us.ibm.com> 2002
+ Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2003
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+uint32 global_client_caps = 0;
+
+/*
+ on a logon error possibly map the error to success if "map to guest"
+ is set approriately
+*/
+static NTSTATUS do_map_to_guest(NTSTATUS status, auth_serversupplied_info **server_info,
+ const char *user, const char *domain)
+{
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
+ if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) ||
+ (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) {
+ DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n",
+ user, domain));
+ status = make_server_info_guest(server_info);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
+ if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",user));
+ status = make_server_info_guest(server_info);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Add the standard 'Samba' signature to the end of the session setup.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static int add_signature(char *outbuf, char *p)
+{
+ char *start = p;
+ fstring lanman;
+
+ fstr_sprintf( lanman, "Samba %s", SAMBA_VERSION_STRING);
+
+ p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Unix", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
+ p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lanman, -1, STR_TERMINATE);
+ p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lp_workgroup(), -1, STR_TERMINATE);
+
+ return PTR_DIFF(p, start);
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Start the signing engine if needed. Don't fail signing here.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static void sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(const auth_serversupplied_info *server_info, char *inbuf)
+{
+ if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started()) {
+ /* We need to start the signing engine
+ * here but a W2K client sends the old
+ * "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
+ * correct one. Subsequent packets will
+ * be correct.
+ */
+ srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, False);
+ }
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Send a security blob via a session setup reply.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL reply_sesssetup_blob(connection_struct *conn, char *outbuf,
+ DATA_BLOB blob, NTSTATUS nt_status)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
+
+ nt_status = nt_status_squash(nt_status);
+ SIVAL(outbuf, smb_rcls, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
+ SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv0, 0xFF); /* no chaining possible */
+ SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, blob.length);
+ p = smb_buf(outbuf);
+
+ /* should we cap this? */
+ memcpy(p, blob.data, blob.length);
+ p += blob.length;
+
+ p += add_signature( outbuf, p );
+
+ set_message_end(outbuf,p);
+
+ show_msg(outbuf);
+ return send_smb(smbd_server_fd(),outbuf);
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Do a 'guest' logon, getting back the
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS check_guest_password(auth_serversupplied_info **server_info)
+{
+ struct auth_context *auth_context;
+ auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
+
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ unsigned char chal[8];
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(chal);
+
+ DEBUG(3,("Got anonymous request\n"));
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_fixed(&auth_context, chal))) {
+ return nt_status;
+ }
+
+ if (!make_user_info_guest(&user_info)) {
+ (auth_context->free)(&auth_context);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ nt_status = auth_context->check_ntlm_password(auth_context, user_info, server_info);
+ (auth_context->free)(&auth_context);
+ free_user_info(&user_info);
+ return nt_status;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+/****************************************************************************
+reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet for kerberos
+****************************************************************************/
+static int reply_spnego_kerberos(connection_struct *conn,
+ char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
+ int length, int bufsize,
+ DATA_BLOB *secblob)
+{
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+ DATA_BLOB ticket;
+ char *client, *p, *domain;
+ fstring netbios_domain_name;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ fstring user;
+ int sess_vuid;
+ NTSTATUS ret;
+ PAC_DATA *pac_data;
+ DATA_BLOB ap_rep, ap_rep_wrapped, response;
+ auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
+ DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ uint8 tok_id[2];
+ DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ fstring real_username;
+ BOOL map_domainuser_to_guest = False;
+ PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info = NULL;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(ticket);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pac_data);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep_wrapped);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(response);
+
+ mem_ctx = talloc_init("reply_spnego_kerberos");
+ if (mem_ctx == NULL)
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY);
+
+ if (!spnego_parse_krb5_wrap(*secblob, &ticket, tok_id)) {
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ ret = ads_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, lp_realm(), &ticket, &client, &pac_data, &ap_rep, &session_key);
+
+ data_blob_free(&ticket);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+ DEBUG(1,("Failed to verify incoming ticket!\n"));
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(3,("Ticket name is [%s]\n", client));
+
+ p = strchr_m(client, '@');
+ if (!p) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Doesn't look like a valid principal\n"));
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ *p = 0;
+
+ /* save the PAC data if we have it */
+
+ if (pac_data) {
+ logon_info = get_logon_info_from_pac(pac_data);
+ netsamlogon_cache_store( client, &logon_info->info3 );
+ }
+
+ if (!strequal(p+1, lp_realm())) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Ticket for foreign realm %s@%s\n", client, p+1));
+ if (!lp_allow_trusted_domains()) {
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* this gives a fully qualified user name (ie. with full realm).
+ that leads to very long usernames, but what else can we do? */
+
+ domain = p+1;
+
+ if (logon_info && logon_info->info3.hdr_logon_dom.uni_str_len) {
+
+ unistr2_to_ascii(netbios_domain_name, &logon_info->info3.uni_logon_dom, -1);
+ domain = netbios_domain_name;
+ DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s] (using PAC)\n", domain));
+
+ } else {
+
+ /* If we have winbind running, we can (and must) shorten the
+ username by using the short netbios name. Otherwise we will
+ have inconsistent user names. With Kerberos, we get the
+ fully qualified realm, with ntlmssp we get the short
+ name. And even w2k3 does use ntlmssp if you for example
+ connect to an ip address. */
+
+ struct winbindd_request wb_request;
+ struct winbindd_response wb_response;
+ NSS_STATUS wb_result;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(wb_request);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(wb_response);
+
+ DEBUG(10, ("Mapping [%s] to short name\n", domain));
+
+ fstrcpy(wb_request.domain_name, domain);
+
+ wb_result = winbindd_request_response(WINBINDD_DOMAIN_INFO,
+ &wb_request, &wb_response);
+
+ if (wb_result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
+
+ fstrcpy(netbios_domain_name,
+ wb_response.data.domain_info.name);
+ domain = netbios_domain_name;
+
+ DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s] (using Winbind)\n", domain));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Could not find short name -- winbind "
+ "not running?\n"));
+ }
+ }
+
+ fstr_sprintf(user, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(), client);
+
+ /* lookup the passwd struct, create a new user if necessary */
+
+ map_username( user );
+
+ pw = smb_getpwnam( user, real_username, True );
+ if (!pw) {
+
+ /* this was originally the behavior of Samba 2.2, if a user
+ did not have a local uid but has been authenticated, then
+ map them to a guest account */
+
+ if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID){
+ map_domainuser_to_guest = True;
+ fstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount());
+ pw = smb_getpwnam( user, real_username, True );
+ }
+
+ /* extra sanity check that the guest account is valid */
+
+ if ( !pw ) {
+ DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n", user));
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* setup the string used by %U */
+
+ sub_set_smb_name( real_username );
+ reload_services(True);
+ if ( map_domainuser_to_guest ) {
+ make_server_info_guest(&server_info);
+ } else if (logon_info) {
+ ret = make_server_info_pac(&server_info, real_username, pw, logon_info);
+
+ if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ) {
+ DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_pac failed!\n"));
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ passwd_free(&pw);
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(ret);
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ ret = make_server_info_pw(&server_info, real_username, pw);
+
+ if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret) ) {
+ DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_from_pw failed!\n"));
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&session_key);
+ passwd_free(&pw);
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+ return ERROR_NT(ret);
+ }
+
+ /* make_server_info_pw does not set the domain. Without this we end up
+ * with the local netbios name in substitutions for %D. */
+
+ if (server_info->sam_account != NULL) {
+ pdb_set_domain(server_info->sam_account, domain, PDB_SET);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ passwd_free(&pw);
+
+ /* register_vuid keeps the server info */
+ /* register_vuid takes ownership of session_key, no need to free after this.
+ A better interface would copy it.... */
+ sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, client);
+
+ SAFE_FREE(client);
+
+ if (sess_vuid == -1) {
+ ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ } else {
+ /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
+ reload_services( True );
+
+ set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
+ SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
+
+ if (server_info->guest) {
+ SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
+ }
+
+ SSVAL(outbuf, smb_uid, sess_vuid);
+
+ sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info, inbuf);
+ }
+
+ /* wrap that up in a nice GSS-API wrapping */
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+ ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep, TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP);
+ } else {
+ ap_rep_wrapped = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ }
+ response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped, ret, OID_KERBEROS5_OLD);
+ reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, ret);
+
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
+ data_blob_free(&ap_rep_wrapped);
+ data_blob_free(&response);
+ talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
+
+ return -1; /* already replied */
+}
+#endif
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Send a session setup reply, wrapped in SPNEGO.
+ Get vuid and check first.
+ End the NTLMSSP exchange context if we are OK/complete fail
+ This should be split into two functions, one to handle each
+ leg of the NTLM auth steps.
+***************************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL reply_spnego_ntlmssp(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
+ uint16 vuid,
+ AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ DATA_BLOB *ntlmssp_blob, NTSTATUS nt_status,
+ BOOL wrap)
+{
+ BOOL ret;
+ DATA_BLOB response;
+ struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ server_info = (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info;
+ } else {
+ nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status,
+ &server_info,
+ (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user,
+ (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->domain);
+ }
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ int sess_vuid;
+ DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob((*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.length);
+
+ /* register_vuid keeps the server info */
+ sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user);
+ (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info = NULL;
+
+ if (sess_vuid == -1) {
+ nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
+ } else {
+
+ /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
+ reload_services( True );
+
+ set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
+ SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
+
+ if (server_info->guest) {
+ SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
+ }
+
+ SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
+
+ sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info, inbuf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (wrap) {
+ response = spnego_gen_auth_response(ntlmssp_blob, nt_status, OID_NTLMSSP);
+ } else {
+ response = *ntlmssp_blob;
+ }
+
+ ret = reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, nt_status);
+ if (wrap) {
+ data_blob_free(&response);
+ }
+
+ /* NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED from our NTLMSSP code tells us,
+ and the other end, that we are not finished yet. */
+
+ if (!ret || !NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+ /* NB. This is *NOT* an error case. JRA */
+ auth_ntlmssp_end(auth_ntlmssp_state);
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static int reply_spnego_negotiate(connection_struct *conn,
+ char *inbuf,
+ char *outbuf,
+ uint16 vuid,
+ int length, int bufsize,
+ DATA_BLOB blob1,
+ AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state)
+{
+ char *OIDs[ASN1_MAX_OIDS];
+ DATA_BLOB secblob;
+ int i;
+ DATA_BLOB chal;
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+ BOOL got_kerberos_mechanism = False;
+#endif
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+ /* parse out the OIDs and the first sec blob */
+ if (!parse_negTokenTarg(blob1, OIDs, &secblob)) {
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ /* only look at the first OID for determining the mechToken --
+ accoirding to RFC2478, we should choose the one we want
+ and renegotiate, but i smell a client bug here..
+
+ Problem observed when connecting to a member (samba box)
+ of an AD domain as a user in a Samba domain. Samba member
+ server sent back krb5/mskrb5/ntlmssp as mechtypes, but the
+ client (2ksp3) replied with ntlmssp/mskrb5/krb5 and an
+ NTLMSSP mechtoken. --jerry */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+ if (strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5, OIDs[0]) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OIDs[0]) == 0) {
+ got_kerberos_mechanism = True;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (i=0;OIDs[i];i++) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Got OID %s\n", OIDs[i]));
+ free(OIDs[i]);
+ }
+ DEBUG(3,("Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length));
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
+ if ( got_kerberos_mechanism && ((lp_security()==SEC_ADS) || lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) ) {
+ int ret = reply_spnego_kerberos(conn, inbuf, outbuf,
+ length, bufsize, &secblob);
+ data_blob_free(&secblob);
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (*auth_ntlmssp_state) {
+ auth_ntlmssp_end(auth_ntlmssp_state);
+ }
+
+ nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_start(auth_ntlmssp_state);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status);
+ }
+
+ nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ secblob, &chal);
+
+ data_blob_free(&secblob);
+
+ reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid, auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ &chal, nt_status, True);
+
+ data_blob_free(&chal);
+
+ /* already replied */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Reply to a session setup spnego auth packet.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static int reply_spnego_auth(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
+ uint16 vuid,
+ int length, int bufsize,
+ DATA_BLOB blob1,
+ AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state)
+{
+ DATA_BLOB auth, auth_reply;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+
+ if (!spnego_parse_auth(blob1, &auth)) {
+#if 0
+ file_save("auth.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
+#endif
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ }
+
+ if (!*auth_ntlmssp_state) {
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+
+ /* auth before negotiatiate? */
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ }
+
+ nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(*auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ auth, &auth_reply);
+
+ data_blob_free(&auth);
+
+ reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid,
+ auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ &auth_reply, nt_status, True);
+
+ data_blob_free(&auth_reply);
+
+ /* and tell smbd that we have already replied to this packet */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Reply to a session setup command.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static int reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,
+ char *outbuf,
+ int length,int bufsize)
+{
+ uint8 *p;
+ DATA_BLOB blob1;
+ int ret;
+ size_t bufrem;
+ fstring native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain;
+ char *p2;
+ uint16 data_blob_len = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv7);
+ enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
+ int vuid = SVAL(inbuf,smb_uid);
+ user_struct *vuser = NULL;
+
+ DEBUG(3,("Doing spnego session setup\n"));
+
+ if (global_client_caps == 0) {
+ global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv10);
+
+ if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
+ remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ p = (uint8 *)smb_buf(inbuf);
+
+ if (data_blob_len == 0) {
+ /* an invalid request */
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ bufrem = smb_bufrem(inbuf, p);
+ /* pull the spnego blob */
+ blob1 = data_blob(p, MIN(bufrem, data_blob_len));
+
+#if 0
+ file_save("negotiate.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
+#endif
+
+ p2 = inbuf + smb_vwv13 + data_blob_len;
+ p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p2, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p2, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p2, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
+ DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
+ native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
+
+ if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
+ /* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string,
+ but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */
+
+ if ( !strlen(native_lanman) )
+ ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
+ else
+ ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
+ }
+
+ vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(vuid);
+ if (!vuser) {
+ vuid = register_vuid(NULL, data_blob(NULL, 0), data_blob(NULL, 0), NULL);
+ if (vuid == -1) {
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ }
+
+ vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(vuid);
+ }
+
+ if (!vuser) {
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ }
+
+ SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,vuid);
+
+ if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
+ /* its a negTokenTarg packet */
+ ret = reply_spnego_negotiate(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid, length, bufsize, blob1,
+ &vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
+ data_blob_free(&blob1);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) {
+ /* its a auth packet */
+ ret = reply_spnego_auth(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid, length, bufsize, blob1,
+ &vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
+ data_blob_free(&blob1);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (strncmp((char *)(blob1.data), "NTLMSSP", 7) == 0) {
+ DATA_BLOB chal;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ if (!vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state) {
+ nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ /* Kill the intermediate vuid */
+ invalidate_vuid(vuid);
+
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status);
+ }
+ }
+
+ nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ blob1, &chal);
+
+ data_blob_free(&blob1);
+
+ reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, vuid,
+ &vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
+ &chal, nt_status, False);
+ data_blob_free(&chal);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* what sort of packet is this? */
+ DEBUG(1,("Unknown packet in reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego\n"));
+
+ data_blob_free(&blob1);
+
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ On new VC == 0, shutdown *all* old connections and users.
+ It seems that only NT4.x does this. At W2K and above (XP etc.).
+ a new session setup with VC==0 is ignored.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static int shutdown_other_smbds(TDB_CONTEXT *tdb, TDB_DATA kbuf, TDB_DATA dbuf,
+ void *p)
+{
+ struct sessionid *sessionid = (struct sessionid *)dbuf.dptr;
+ const char *ip = (const char *)p;
+
+ if (!process_exists(pid_to_procid(sessionid->pid))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sessionid->pid == sys_getpid()) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(ip, sessionid->ip_addr) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ message_send_pid(pid_to_procid(sessionid->pid), MSG_SHUTDOWN,
+ NULL, 0, True);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void setup_new_vc_session(void)
+{
+ DEBUG(2,("setup_new_vc_session: New VC == 0, if NT4.x compatible we would close all old resources.\n"));
+#if 0
+ conn_close_all();
+ invalidate_all_vuids();
+#endif
+ if (lp_reset_on_zero_vc()) {
+ session_traverse(shutdown_other_smbds, client_addr());
+ }
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Reply to a session setup command.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,
+ int length,int bufsize)
+{
+ int sess_vuid;
+ int smb_bufsize;
+ DATA_BLOB lm_resp;
+ DATA_BLOB nt_resp;
+ DATA_BLOB plaintext_password;
+ fstring user;
+ fstring sub_user; /* Sainitised username for substituion */
+ fstring domain;
+ fstring native_os;
+ fstring native_lanman;
+ fstring primary_domain;
+ static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
+ extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
+ extern BOOL global_spnego_negotiated;
+ extern enum protocol_types Protocol;
+ extern int max_send;
+
+ auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
+ extern struct auth_context *negprot_global_auth_context;
+ auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
+
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+
+ BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
+
+ DATA_BLOB session_key;
+
+ START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(lm_resp);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(nt_resp);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(plaintext_password);
+
+ DEBUG(3,("wct=%d flg2=0x%x\n", CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct), SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2)));
+
+ /* a SPNEGO session setup has 12 command words, whereas a normal
+ NT1 session setup has 13. See the cifs spec. */
+ if (CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct) == 12 &&
+ (SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY)) {
+ if (!global_spnego_negotiated) {
+ DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt at SPNEGO session setup when it was not negoitiated.\n"));
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) {
+ setup_new_vc_session();
+ }
+ return reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize);
+ }
+
+ smb_bufsize = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv2);
+
+ if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
+ uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
+
+ /* Never do NT status codes with protocols before NT1 as we don't get client caps. */
+ remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
+
+ if ((passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) || (passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, smb_buf(inbuf)))) {
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ }
+
+ if (doencrypt) {
+ lm_resp = data_blob(smb_buf(inbuf), passlen1);
+ } else {
+ plaintext_password = data_blob(smb_buf(inbuf), passlen1+1);
+ /* Ensure null termination */
+ plaintext_password.data[passlen1] = 0;
+ }
+
+ srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, smb_buf(inbuf)+passlen1, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
+ *domain = 0;
+
+ } else {
+ uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
+ uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv8);
+ enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
+ char *p = smb_buf(inbuf);
+ char *save_p = smb_buf(inbuf);
+ uint16 byte_count;
+
+
+ if(global_client_caps == 0) {
+ global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv11);
+
+ if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
+ remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
+ }
+
+ /* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95.
+ This is needed to return the correct error codes in some
+ circumstances.
+ */
+
+ if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
+ if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) {
+ set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!doencrypt) {
+ /* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password lengths for
+ non-encrypting systems. Uggh.
+
+ if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting the
+ password length incorrectly. Luckily it still works with the
+ default code because Win95 will null terminate the password
+ anyway
+
+ if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box and its
+ setting passlen2 to some random value which really stuffs
+ things up. we need to fix that one. */
+
+ if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 && passlen2 != 1)
+ passlen2 = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* check for nasty tricks */
+ if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p)) {
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ }
+
+ if (passlen2 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen2 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p+passlen1)) {
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ }
+
+ /* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */
+
+ if ((doencrypt) && (passlen1 != 0) && (passlen1 != 24)) {
+ doencrypt = False;
+ }
+
+ if (doencrypt) {
+ lm_resp = data_blob(p, passlen1);
+ nt_resp = data_blob(p+passlen1, passlen2);
+ } else {
+ pstring pass;
+ BOOL unic=SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
+
+#if 0
+ /* This was the previous fix. Not sure if it's still valid. JRA. */
+ if ((ra_type == RA_WINNT) && (passlen2 == 0) && unic && passlen1) {
+ /* NT4.0 stuffs up plaintext unicode password lengths... */
+ srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf) + 1,
+ sizeof(pass), passlen1, STR_TERMINATE);
+#endif
+
+ if (unic && (passlen2 == 0) && passlen1) {
+ /* Only a ascii plaintext password was sent. */
+ srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf), sizeof(pass),
+ passlen1, STR_TERMINATE|STR_ASCII);
+ } else {
+ srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf),
+ sizeof(pass), unic ? passlen2 : passlen1,
+ STR_TERMINATE);
+ }
+ plaintext_password = data_blob(pass, strlen(pass)+1);
+ }
+
+ p += passlen1 + passlen2;
+ p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, p, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
+ p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
+
+ /* not documented or decoded by Ethereal but there is one more string
+ in the extra bytes which is the same as the PrimaryDomain when using
+ extended security. Windows NT 4 and 2003 use this string to store
+ the native lanman string. Windows 9x does not include a string here
+ at all so we have to check if we have any extra bytes left */
+
+ byte_count = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv13);
+ if ( PTR_DIFF(p, save_p) < byte_count)
+ p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
+ else
+ fstrcpy( primary_domain, "null" );
+
+ DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
+ domain, native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
+
+ if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
+ if ( strlen(native_lanman) == 0 )
+ ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
+ else
+ ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) {
+ setup_new_vc_session();
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n", domain, user, get_remote_machine_name()));
+
+ if (*user) {
+ if (global_spnego_negotiated) {
+
+ /* This has to be here, because this is a perfectly valid behaviour for guest logons :-( */
+
+ DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt at 'normal' session setup after negotiating spnego.\n"));
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+ fstrcpy(sub_user, user);
+ } else {
+ fstrcpy(sub_user, lp_guestaccount());
+ }
+
+ sub_set_smb_name(sub_user);
+
+ reload_services(True);
+
+ if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
+ /* in share level we should ignore any passwords */
+
+ data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
+ data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
+ data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
+
+ map_username(sub_user);
+ add_session_user(sub_user);
+ /* Then force it to null for the benfit of the code below */
+ *user = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!*user) {
+
+ nt_status = check_guest_password(&server_info);
+
+ } else if (doencrypt) {
+ if (!negprot_global_auth_context) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Attempted encrypted session setup without negprot denied!\n"));
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+ nt_status = make_user_info_for_reply_enc(&user_info, user, domain,
+ lm_resp, nt_resp);
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ nt_status = negprot_global_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(negprot_global_auth_context,
+ user_info,
+ &server_info);
+ }
+ } else {
+ struct auth_context *plaintext_auth_context = NULL;
+ const uint8 *chal;
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_subsystem(&plaintext_auth_context))) {
+ chal = plaintext_auth_context->get_ntlm_challenge(plaintext_auth_context);
+
+ if (!make_user_info_for_reply(&user_info,
+ user, domain, chal,
+ plaintext_password)) {
+ nt_status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ nt_status = plaintext_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(plaintext_auth_context,
+ user_info,
+ &server_info);
+
+ (plaintext_auth_context->free)(&plaintext_auth_context);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ free_user_info(&user_info);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, &server_info, user, domain);
+ }
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
+ data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
+ data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
+ return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(nt_status));
+ }
+
+ if (server_info->user_session_key.data) {
+ session_key = data_blob(server_info->user_session_key.data, server_info->user_session_key.length);
+ } else {
+ session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
+
+ /* it's ok - setup a reply */
+ set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
+ if (Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) {
+ char *p = smb_buf( outbuf );
+ p += add_signature( outbuf, p );
+ set_message_end( outbuf, p );
+ /* perhaps grab OS version here?? */
+ }
+
+ if (server_info->guest) {
+ SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
+ }
+
+ /* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections
+ to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */
+
+ /* register_vuid keeps the server info */
+ sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nt_resp.data ? nt_resp : lm_resp, sub_user);
+ data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
+ data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
+
+ if (sess_vuid == -1) {
+ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */
+ reload_services( True );
+
+ sessionsetup_start_signing_engine(server_info, inbuf);
+
+ SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
+ SSVAL(inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
+
+ if (!done_sesssetup)
+ max_send = MIN(max_send,smb_bufsize);
+
+ done_sesssetup = True;
+
+ END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
+ return chain_reply(inbuf,outbuf,length,bufsize);
+}
projects / samba / blobdiff